What does the fund scandal have to do with the tensions in Azerbaijan? Who is pulling the strings?

Yaşar Aydın There are interesting developments taking place both within and outside Turkey. In particular, developments concerning Turkey’s neighbours are on a scale that will influence the direction of politics in Turkey. Let’s start with Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan, the heartland of Turkish nationalism, has been Turkey’s closest ally since declaring its independence 35 years ago. It is not only Turkey’s most important political partner but also its most significant economic partner. Azerbaijan has investments in Turkey exceeding 20 billion dollars.

The Azerbaijani state-owned company SOCAR is the largest international investor in Turkey. The STAR Refinery and Petkim alone are sufficient to demonstrate their significance in the Turkish economy. On the other hand, 5,800 Turkish companies are operating in Azerbaijan and have made investments totalling approximately 12 billion dollars.

The two countries’ fates are intertwined through pipelines and roads. As is well known, this relationship was formalised with the Shusha Declaration signed in 2021. However, in recent days, the issue of the headscarf has come between the two states.

Azerbaijan’s ban on headscarves in schools was condemned by Palace spokespeople – following reports in pro-government publications such as Yeni Şafak – with a reminder of the support provided during the war with Armenia. A strong response came from Azerbaijan. Indeed, when statements condemning Turkey began to emerge, MHP leader Bahçeli stepped in.

Bahçeli warned the Presidential Palace and recalled the history of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. Whilst a response from AKP members to this warning from Bahçeli was awaited, the move came from former Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım. Yıldırım stated, ‘Who has the right to interfere in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs?

We would punish them in the harshest possible manner.’ Although it is unclear on whose behalf Yıldırım was speaking, it is quite evident that he was attempting to bring AKP members into line. Foreign Minister Fidan’s contacts in Azerbaijan were also aimed at defusing the situation. Although the matter has been put on the back burner, it remains an issue.

Another interesting development concerns a guest due to arrive from the southern part of Cyprus. The leader of the Greek Cypriot Administration, Christodoulides, has confirmed that he will be visiting Turkey for the COP31 Climate Summit to be held in Antalya. This visit marks the first such visit in 10 years.

Although the visit is being brushed off on both sides as merely an ‘international meeting’ without any deeper significance, it is quite clear that a senior figure has instructed: ‘Establish contact.’ Another key issue is Yemen. The process, which began with travel bans designed to put Iran under economic pressure, has gone as far as paving the way for a ground operation against the Houthis. ISRAEL IS VERY HAPPY The common thread running through these developments is that they align with the policies of Israel and the US.

As is well known, Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s biggest supporters in the region. Aliyev reminds everyone at every opportunity of the strong ties he has forged with Israel. Cyprus’s importance regarding natural gas exploration and military bases in the Mediterranean is plain to see.

Israel has long shown a particular interest in Cyprus. Finally, the Yemen issue… The Houthis are effectively Iran’s most important remaining ally in the region. Turkey’s explicit alignment with Saudi Arabia serves as a serious warning to Iran.

Over the past few years, Turkey has been moving towards a position of complete subservience to US policies to an extent never seen before. The AKP and MHP have taken such a course on this issue that they have no intention of even looking back at the Palestinian, Kurdish, Azerbaijani and Cypriot issues they have left behind. Yet the stance taken on these issues over the past 40–50 years had formed the backbone of the Turkish right.

That backbone is no longer in place. There is serious confusion within the right-wing camp, particularly amongst the grassroots of the parties forming the People’s Alliance. IMPACT ON POLITICS For years, the AKP kept the headscarf issue on the agenda.

This narrative of victimhood continues even today. The resolution of the Kurdish issue through repression has been virtually the raison d’être of both the AKP and the MHP. Cyprus has been portrayed as a cause.

All the developments of recent months indicate that the ground is shifting beneath their feet in this area. Add to this the stance on Palestine and the support given to the US regarding the reconstruction of Gaza, and there is very little left. Turkish conservatism is gradually distancing itself from all the issues it has exploited to build a mass base.

All that remains is the narrative of a strong Turkey set to play a role in the region’s reconstruction. THE FUND SCANDAL All these developments are unfolding during the same timeframe as the fund scandal, which has deeply shaken the country and the regime. This may, of course, be a coincidence.

Even so, it does not mean there is no connection. Let us try to shed some light on the matter with a couple of brief notes: The fund scandal undoubtedly erupted as a result of external intervention. In other words, a foreign power said, ‘Put an end to this.’ When the messages they had Mehmet Şimşek convey proved ineffective, the demand was expressed in clearer terms.

From that moment on, various names began to surface. Aside from those swiftly made ‘scapegoats’, there were others whose involvement was attempted to be covered up. Note that their common trait was their proximity to the Palace.

Almost the entire incident was taking place just a few metres away from Erdoğan. This was so blatant that the pro-government media began running headlines declaring, ‘Erdoğan is the target of the operation!’ With the information at our disposal, it is impossible to determine whether a message was sent to the regime through this operation—triggered from abroad—or what form that message took. However, there are a few points we can draw from what has happened: • The US and Trump have taken the reins and believe they can make Turkey do whatever they want.

• On the path charted by the US, Iran is marked as a threat to Turkey, whilst Israel is designated as an ally. Azerbaijan serves as a model country regarding the alignment with the US’s desired position. There should be no unnecessary issues with it.

• The US does not want any issues that would cause Israel headaches, particularly regarding Cyprus and Gaza. • Erdoğan and Bahçeli are convinced by the US’s new roadmap, but their grassroots support does not share the same view. We constantly emphasise that the government is in an extremely fragile period.

Already sufficiently worn down by its economic policies, the regime is also drifting further from its grassroots support due to its political choices. Consequently, the regime has nothing left to offer but raw coercion and violence. It is worth taking another look at the MHP leader’s statement: ‘Give us legislative power, and we will sort it out.’ Knowing it cannot change the preferences of its own people, the regime believes it can govern the country with the ‘legitimacy’ it will receive from the US.

However, there is an immutable truth of history and politics: no legitimacy imported from abroad can prop up a government that has completely lost the consent of its people at home. Washington’s approval or loyalty to the course charted by global actors is not enough to quell the anger of the millions who cannot put bread on the table, who are struggling with poverty and who are weary of injustice. A political structure that, with a stroke of the pen, wipes out the fundamental concerns that have sustained its own base for years, and which bases its existence solely on external power balances and internal apparatus of repression, can only delay its collapse for a short while.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Fon skandalının Azerbaycan gerilimi ile ne ilgisi var? İpler kimin elinde?, published in BirGün newspaper on October 19, 2026.